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I.          INTRODUCTION 
As Hume remarks, the view that aesthetic evaluations are ‘subjective’ is part of 
common sense—one certainly meets it often enough in conversation. As philosophers, 
we can distinguish the one sense of the claim (‘aesthetic evaluations are mind-
dependent’) from another (‘aesthetic evaluations are relative’). A plausible reading of 
the former claim (‘some of the grounds of some aesthetic evaluations are response-
dependent’) is true. This paper concerns the latter claim. It is not unknown, or even 
unexpected, to find people who believe that aesthetic evaluations are culturally 
relative, or even agent-relative. A cultural relativist would hold that there is no way to 
adjudicate an apparent disagreement between, say, a Japanese critic who finds Wright 
of Derby clunky and unsubtle, and a British critic who finds Utamaro’s flower 
pictures overly pretty and sentimental. An agent-relativist would hold there was no 
way to adjudicate between someone who thought Renoir sickly sweet, and someone 
who found his work ravishingly beautiful. The view is little discussed in 
contemporary Anglo-American aesthetics in exactly this form, although the attempts 
to prove the intersubjective validity of aesthetic evaluation (ISV),1 would, if they 
worked, show relativism to be false. Furthermore, thoughts on aesthetic relativism can 
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be found amongst those writing in aesthetics. The immediate spur for this essay is an 
unpublished paper by Jesse Prinz.2 
First, let me say what I mean by aesthetic relativism. 
 The judgement ‘x is aesthetically valuable’ means no more than ‘A finds x to be 
aesthetically valuable’. 
 For cultural relativism, A is some cultural group and for agent-relativism A is 
some individual. Few, if anyone, would think that everything that counted as an 
aesthetic judgement is relative. For the sake of simplicity, I shall ignore this caveat as 
the kinds of judgement I will be talking about are generally the kinds of judgement 
that those inclined to relativism think are relativist: namely, aesthetic evaluations. 
 There are two things we can note immediately. First, there is one big advantage to 
this view: namely, it relieves us of the need to provide an account of ISV. Hume 
begins with his Lockean account of beauty (roughly, ‘beauty is in the eye of the 
beholder’) and then struggles to show that this is compatible with ISV. Relativism at 
least provides an explanation of why philosophers (including the greatest 
philosophers) have struggled to come up with a justification for ISV; there isn’t one. 
Second, relativism does not have to be unsophisticated about what counts as ‘finding’. 
It need not mean ‘A finds x to be aesthetically valuable in all circumstances on all 
occasions’. It can add a plethora of caveats: that A needs to be qualified in various 
ways and that the circumstances need to be right in various ways. However, what 
makes it relativism is the denial that such caveats give grounds for the judgement 
being binding on anyone who is not A. 
 Apart from ‘finding’, the other obviously problematic phrase in the formulation is 
‘aesthetically valuable’. What exactly the term ‘aesthetics’ refers to varies from writer 
to writer. In this paper I shall follow Prinz and consider aesthetic evaluations with two 
kinds of content: judgements on physical attractiveness of persons, and then 
judgements on works of art. First, I will examine a general consideration that seems 
incompatible with relativism, and second, I will consider a more serious response to 
relativism. For simplicity, I will, in general, restrict my discussion to visual 
attractiveness and the visual arts. 
 One reason for thinking aesthetic evaluations are relative is that the grounds for 
aesthetic evaluations are some elicited non-cognitive affect. In more old fashioned 
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Humean terms, the content of the judgement ‘x is aesthetically valuable’ is something 
like ‘I find x pleasurable’ or, if we wanted to be cultural relativists ‘I, and others of 
my culture, find x pleasurable’. From this position, one might investigate whether as a 
matter of fact different people or different cultures find different things pleasurable. It 
might turn out that there is variation, either among individuals or among cultures, and 
it might turn out that there is no variation among individuals, or no variation among 
cultures. One could label the first of these positions ‘relativism’ and the second of 
these positions ‘universalism’ (this is how Prinz uses the terms). However, that is not 
the contrast in which I am interested given the way I have defined ‘relativism’. The 
universalist position here is still relativist: it is still that case that ‘x is aesthetically 
valuable’ means no more than ‘A finds x to be aesthetically valuable’. It just so 
happens that we all find the same things aesthetically valuable. Showing that, as a 
matter of fact, everybody likes jam would not show that a liking for jam is not a mere 
preference. As it is a mere preference it is, on my terms, relative. 
 What, then, would be non-relativism on my terms? (As the term ‘universal’ does 
not contrast with ‘relative’, as explained in the last paragraph, I shall contrast 
‘relative’ with ‘absolute’ despite the misleading connotations of the term.) One could 
say that aesthetic value is real, objective, part of the fabric of the world; it is a fact 
about an object as to whether or not it possesses it, or it is such that real disagreement 
is possible as to whether or not an object possesses it. However, these claims are open 
to varying metaphysical interpretations, which place them at varying distances from 
relativism. So in what follows I shall not rely on an exact definition of absolutism, but 
simply explore whether or how far we can get from relativism. 
 
II.         SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF ATTRACTIVENESS 
Prinz makes a case, based on surveys and other sociological evidence, for judgements 
of physical attractiveness varying across time and space. He concludes: “Views of 
physical attractiveness are not universal, and there is no way to adjudicate when 
conflicting trends are found”.3 However, views similar to that which I am attributing 
to the relativist have been criticized for starting with the actual preferences of people, 
as those preferences can be in some ways systematically malformed. There is a view, 
common in some parts of feminist philosophy, that ideals of attractiveness have 
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evolved so as to systematically undermine the status of women in contemporary 
Western society.4 Let us call the ideal of female attractiveness in contemporary 
Western culture ‘F’. Consider the following claim: 
 
1.)     ‘F’ is a pernicious social construct. 
 
Someone who believed this might hold the following: 
 
2.)    I find someone manifesting ‘F’ aesthetically valuable, but they are not really 
aesthetically valuable (rather, I have just been manipulated into thinking so). 
 
This is a negative thesis: it only says that some people a person finds aesthetically 
valuable they ought not to find aesthetically valuable. It does not say that there are 
some people a person ought to find aesthetically valuable.  
 One could run a similar argument with respect to the aesthetic value of works of 
art. One might hold, for example, that the ideals of aesthetic value in works of art are 
a social construct that foregrounds some notions of attractiveness (those that appeal to 
people of a certain race, sex or class) at the expense of others.5 Once again, someone 
who believed this could end up claiming that although one finds a work of art 
aesthetically valuable, it is not really aesthetically valuable (one has been manipulated 
into thinking so). 
 These arguments depend on whether we can move from: 
 
3.)       A has been manipulated into finding x to be aesthetically valuable. 
 
to: 
 
4.)       x is not really aesthetically valuable (even to A). 
 
This inference seems suspect. It would not follow, for example, from my discovering 
that I had been manipulated into finding the taste of broccoli pleasant, that I did not 
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    The classic statement is in Wolf (1990); a more recent, and more sophisticated account, can be 
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5
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really find the taste of broccoli pleasant. A difference between the broccoli case and 
the cases we are considering is that individuals might wish to resist pernicious 
socially constructed norms of attractiveness; that is, not conform to them. Hence, we 
could move from 
 
3a.)      A has been manipulated into finding x to be aesthetically valuable. 
 
to: 
 
4a.)      A ought not to find x aesthetically valuable, or A does not think x merits being 
found aesthetically valuable. 
 
It does not seem such a stretch of language to express these views with the claim ‘x is 
not really aesthetically valuable’. 
 Even if we grant that all these arguments go through, what damage is done to the 
relativist position? If ideals of aesthetic value are a pernicious social construct, then 
there are non-relative, moral grounds, against the inference from ‘I find x to be 
aesthetically valuable’ to ‘x is aesthetically valuable’. This shows only that in such 
circumstances, A should not trust his or her finding x to be aesthetically valuable; that 
is, A’s ability to find things aesthetically valuable has been systematically 
undermined. It does not show that aesthetic evaluations are intersubjectively valid. 
The relativist claim could still be true in a society where there are no pernicious social 
constructs. In other words, being in thrall to a pernicious social construct can join 
being drunk, having jaundice, being inexpert, or whatever as one more thing that the 
relativist can allow makes a judgement untrustworthy. Only the ideologically pure 
could make aesthetic evaluations that were above reproach, but they might still be 
relativist for all that. 
 
III.      RELATIVISM AND UNDERSTANDING 
A better challenge to relativism begins by firmly distinguishing between preferences 
and judgements of value. Preferences are, in my sense of the term, agent-relative. A 
psychologist might show the inhabitants of Cambridge images of 20 rectangles, and it 
turns out that 60% of respondents prefer rectangle 14. The same survey, conducted in 
Beijing, has the result that 60% of respondents prefer rectangle 12. There is neither 
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ground nor reason for us to attempt to adjudicate between the different visual 
preferences of individuals and the different visual preferences of cultures. Indeed, as 
discussed above, relativism (as I understand it) would not be undermined even if the 
result was that everyone preferred rectangle 14 (as, or so the rumour has it, among 
ratios, everyone prefers a ratio of 1.618—the ‘golden ratio’). 
 Are judgements of aesthetic value in the arts expressions of a positive reaction (or, 
as Prinz holds, expressions of a positive reaction with the additional claim that the 
object being regarded elicited that positive reaction)? Here are two reasons for 
thinking not. First, we distinguish the judgement ‘I like it’ from the judgement ‘It is 
good’. It is not so much that the judgements can come apart (although surely they can 
come apart) but that we take them to be different judgements. The relativist could 
agree: the judgement ‘I like x’ is a mere preference; a mere expression of liking, while 
the grounds for the judgement ‘x is good’ is some different, more complicated 
affective reaction. Nonetheless, it is an affective reaction; people either have it or they 
do not have it, and thus relativism is still in the picture. If there are entirely ‘cold’ 
judgements (the judgement that ‘x is good’ made in the absence of an affective 
reaction) it is an ‘inverted-commas’ judgement. That is, a judgement that really means 
something like ‘This is good according to the critics’, or ‘This makes an interesting 
move in the current debate within the artworld’, or ‘I know I ought to like this even if 
I do not’. I find the relativist’s way of construing the distinction between expressions 
of preference and judgements of value unconvincing. That is, I see no reason (apart 
from the desire to explain them away) to think that ‘cold’ judgements are, in fact, 
‘inverted-comma’ judgements. 
 There is a second, and I think more persuasive, intuition-pump to push us to think 
that judgements of aesthetic value are not grounded in affective reactions: that such a 
view does not make sense of our engagement with art. Here is an example which 
might be familiar, or, if not familiar, at least plausible. Rothko is in many ways a 
difficult painter. Is there enough there for his paintings to be great paintings? Is what 
is there more to do with overwhelming affect than anything particularly valuable? 
One can imagine puzzling over this question for years; visiting the Rothko collections 
in London, Houston and Washington; buying the biography and the various books on 
or by Rothko. One can imagine that, sometime or other, one is standing in the Rothko 
room at the Tate looking (yet again) at the paintings and asking oneself whether they 
are great paintings. What is it that one is asking oneself? It is surely not the question 
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of whether, in the scheme of things, Rothko’s paintings elicit a positive affective 
reaction. That should take no longer to answer than it would take to fill in a 
psychologist’s questionnaire. One is surely not checking the defeaters for judgement 
that the relativist does allow do not apply; that is, one is not checking one is not 
drunk, that the lighting is adequate and so on. So what is one doing? One is, surely, 
trying to work out whether the paintings possess aesthetic value. 
 Let us, for the moment, grant the distinction for which I am arguing. That is, that 
there is a distinction between expressions of a positive affective reaction (together 
with the claim that the object expressed that affective reaction) and judgements of 
aesthetic value. What would the latter have to be like in order not to be relativist?  
 What is the person who is struggling to assess Rothko struggling to achieve? The 
answer, surely, is that they are struggling to put themselves into a position where they 
can understand Rothko’s work. More accurately, they are trying to put themselves 
into a position where they will have an experience of Rothko’s work which is 
informed by their understanding the work correctly. This claim has been defended by 
Malcolm Budd, who summarizes it as follows:6 
 
The intersubjective validity of a judgement that attributes a high, medium, or low artistic 
value to a work is determined by how valuable it is to experience the work with 
understanding.7  
 
The approach Budd takes in his most extended discussion of this is to give a 
conceptual analysis of the artistic value. That is, he is not providing a defence of his 
view that aesthetic value is ‘intersubjective’, but rather is claiming that our concept of 
aesthetic value is that the value is intersubjective. If Budd’s analysis is right, than 
relativists are either revisionists or are arguing that we cannot apply our concept of 
aesthetic value correctly. 
According to Budd: 
 
You attribute artistic value to a work in so far and to the degree that you regard the 
experience it offers as being intrinsically valuable. For you to regard an experience as 
being intrinsically valuable, is for you to consider it right or appropriate, merited or 
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    Budd (2007), p.97. 
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justified, to find it intrinsically rewarding. An experience merits such a response if there is 
good reason to find it intrinsically rewarding.8 
 
What does this view suggest about relativism? Let us grant (as Budd does) that, for 
some works, there is more than one evaluation of the work that is not incorrect;9 that 
works of art do not possess artistic value to a precise degree, and are thus 
incommensurable; and that artistic value is doubly anthropomorphic: the experience is 
only available to the human sensibility, and only someone with a human sensibility 
will value the experience.10 
 For the view to be compatible with cultural relativism, it would have to be the case 
that when someone of culture A claims ‘x is aesthetically valuable’ he or she means ‘x 
merits being found intrinsically rewarding for people of culture A’. The relativist 
might seek support in the thought that people of a non-A culture would not (or could 
not) understand the work. Only somebody who grew up in the A culture, fully 
appreciated it nuances and so on would (or could) ever be a position to get to grips 
with it. However, that thought, which is independently implausible in both its weaker 
and stronger versions, would not be enough to deliver relativism. What is claimed is 
that ‘x is aesthetically valuable’ is equivalent to ‘If one were to understand this work, 
it would merit being found intrinsically valuable’—an absolute truth. That someone 
would not (or could not) understand x is irrelevant. That is, to claim that a particular 
work of Japanese art is aesthetically valuable is to claim that were someone to 
understand the work, it would merit being found intrinsically valuable. That is true 
whether or not someone from the West would (or could) understand it. 
The same considerations apply in the case of agent-relativism. The agent-relativist 
would need to claim that ‘x is aesthetically valuable’ would mean ‘x merits being 
found intrinsically rewarding for A’. However, the idea that x is such that it merits 
being found intrinsically rewarding, but that is true only for A, is barely coherent. It 
would be as if the person in the intuition-pump above, having studied the pictures and 
read the books, came to the conclusion that Rothko’s pictures did merit being found 
intrinsically valuable, but that this merit claim applied only to him or her.  
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    Budd (2004), p.270. 
9
    Budd (2004), p.273 holds the absolutist could make this claim. He does not endorse it himself. 
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    Ibid, p.269-71. 
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 How should the relativist respond to this? They might begin by pointing out an 
implausible consequence of the absolutist position: namely, that, as a matter of fact, 
people do disagree as to whether or not a particular work of art possesses aesthetic 
value. What is the absolutist’s diagnosis of disagreement? It seems too trite merely to 
say that at least one of the parties to the disagreement is suffering from some 
epistemological failure that further thought would remedy. 
There are a number of replies the absolutist can make here. First, the extent of 
aesthetic disagreement should not be over-stated. There is a great deal more 
agreement than disagreement about, and, even where there is disagreement, it is often 
grounded in substantial agreement. However, that does not meet the relativist’s point: 
granted that there is at least some disagreement, what is the absolutist’s diagnosis of 
it? 
The second reply is that not everything that appears to be a disagreement is a 
disagreement; it could simply be conflicting preferences. That is, different people 
might like different works of art, or might prefer to spend time (or money) on 
different works of art. Absolutism says nothing about expressions of preferences 
which may or may not match. The absolutist claim is that there are judgements of 
aesthetic value which are not merely expressions of preference, and that these are 
ISV. 
The third reply is that disagreement could be rooted in epistemological failure. The 
relativist is surely right to claim that it would be embarrassing to absolutism to have 
to claim that all disagreements are rooted in epistemological failure, however it is 
plausible to think that some are. That is, it is part of Budd’s position that an evaluation 
that is not grounded in understanding can be discounted.11 Such a position might be 
thought elitist, but, if so, it is surely elitism of a benign kind. That the worth of a 
person’s evaluation of an object or activity is valuable to the extent that it is grounded 
in an understanding of that object or activity is true of many things besides art. There 
is no sense in asking for an evaluation of a game of cricket from someone who does 
not understand cricket. They can tell you what they liked about it (the players look 
nice in white) and what they didn’t like about it (it was very boring when wickets 
were not falling). However, these claims—however biographically interesting—are 
worthless as evaluations of the game of cricket. It is unclear why we would not be 
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right to discount evaluations of works of art that are not grounded in understanding in 
the same way. 
These three replies are, in themselves, enough to take much of the strength out of 
the relativist’s demand for an explanation of disagreement. The absolutist, however, 
has three further replies that take is into difficult areas in the philosophy of art. First, 
there could be more than one understanding of a work that was both correct and 
complete. An uncontroversial example is difficult to find, as the claim that there is a 
uniquely correct and complete understanding is compatible with the claim that the 
meaning of a work might be ambiguous, or it might be indeterminate.12 Nonetheless, 
if there were more than one understanding of a work that was both complete and 
correct, this would explain some aesthetic disagreement. 
Second, even if there were, for each work, a uniquely correct and complete 
understanding, that might support incompatible evaluations.13 That is, one person 
might take another person to have understood the work correctly, but disagree that the 
understanding provides reasons for the evaluation. The relativist might sense a 
concession here: if two people agree on the understanding of a work but disagree on 
its evaluation and nothing more can be said then we have a relativistic situation of 
‘blameless disagreement’. However, it is not the case that nothing more can be said. 
The two antagonists can discuss their reasons for taking their understanding to support 
their evaluation. Even if it is unlikely that the argument could be settled easily, there 
is no pressure to retreat to relativism. Consider an example (this time from Literature). 
Two people might agree on their understanding of D.H. Lawrence’s Sons and Lovers. 
However, one could take the position Wyndham Lewis argued for in Paleface, that 
Lawrence’s valorisation of feeling over intellect, primitivism over sophistication, is 
immature; the other might take the Leavisite position that such matters are indicative 
of Lawrence’s integrity and moral seriousness. This is a substantial disagreement: 
nothing like a difference in preferences or gustatory taste where relativism would be 
appropriate. 
Third, apparent aesthetic disagreement could stem from at least one of the parties 
having a correct understanding, but an incorrect evaluation. Sentimentality, or an 
immaturity of taste, might lead to an overvaluation of things such as the pace of the 
narrative and an under-evaluation of psychological characterization. Alternatively, to 
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take a case from the visual arts, someone might understand a picture correctly, in its 
full art-historical context, but overrate the importance of the project in which the artist 
was engaged. That a particular work marked the next development of Greenbergian 
modernism is no reason to place a high aesthetic value on it if there is little value in 
developing Greenbergian modernism. 
Thus the absolutist has resources on which to draw to explain the fact of 
disagreement. There is also a tu quoque argument: how can the relativist explain why 
disagreements are not simply apparent disagreements? That is, how can the relativist 
explain criticism (which I take to be the practice of debating reasons for evaluations) 
if there is nothing to be explained? There is no practice of debating whether or not the 
taste of broccoli is or is not actually good. So if relativism were true, why is there a 
practice of debating whether or not particular works of art are or are not actually 
good? 
Apart from the two intuition pumps, I have not provided an argument for the ISV 
of aesthetic evaluations. All I have done is to show that there is a construal of 
aesthetic evaluations of works of art in which they, in contrast to aesthetic evaluations 
of physical attractiveness, say, are not relativist. If this alternative construal is correct, 
this has consequences for work done in psychology on beauty and work done in 
philosophy on beauty. If the former construes beauty as something like ‘visual 
preference’ and the latter construes beauty as something like ‘aesthetic merit’, then it 
is not clear that results in the former will do much to inform the latter. 
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